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ABSTRACT
The present study examines the relationship between board characteristics and earnings quality after the amendment of 
the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance in 2007. Using heteroskedasticity-corrected least square regressions upon 
a sample of Malaysian firms listed in 2008 and 2009, the study finds that the quality of earnings is higher among firms 
with independent chairmen than among those firms with non-independent chairmen. However, in contradiction to the 
expectations of the study, inconclusive results are found concerning board independence. The results also demonstrate that 
investors do not perceive board size as a good indicator of quality earnings. The findings imply that investors continue 
to have reservations regarding the ability of boards to enhance the quality of earnings, although efforts have been made 
to reform corporate governance following the Asian financial crisis. The study serves as a signal to policy makers to 
evaluate the importance of board mechanisms when enhancing financial reporting quality in emerging markets. 
Keywords: Corporate governance; board mechanisms; earnings persistence; earnings predictability; earnings 
informativeness, earnings quality
ABSTRAK
Kajian ini mengkaji hubungan antara ciri-ciri lembaga pengarah dengan kualiti pendapatan selepas Kod Tadbir Urus 
Korporat Malaysia dipinda pada tahun 2007. Kajian menggunakan heteroskedasticity-corrected least square regressions ke 
atas satu sampel yang kecil merangkumi syarikat-syarikat yang tersenarai pada tahun 2008 dan 2009. Kajian mendapati 
kualiti pendapatan adalah lebih tinggi bagi firma yang mana pengerusinya adalah bebas berbanding dengan yang tidak 
bebas. Walau bagaimanapun, keputusan bagi kebebasan lembaga pengarah adalah tidak menentu. Kajian juga mendapati 
yang pelabur tidak menjangka bahawa saiz lembaga pengarah adalah indikasi kepada kualiti pendapatan. Dapatan 
kajian ini menunjukkan yang pelabur masih ragu-ragu terhadap keupayaan lembaga pengarah dalam mempengaruhi 
kualiti pendapatan, walaupun terdapat inisiatif untuk membuat perubahan kepada tadbir urus syarikat selepas krisis 
kewangan Asia. Kajian ini memberi isyarat kepada penggubal polisi untuk menilai pentingnya mekanisme lembaga 
pengarah dalam meningkatkan kualiti pelaporan kewangan dalam kalangan negara membangun.
Kata kunci: Tadbir urus korporat; mekanisma lembaga pengarah; ketekalan pendapatan; kebolehramalan pendapatan; 
kebermaklumatan pendapatan; kualiti pendapatan
INTRODUCTION
The importance of good corporate governance in attracting 
long-term investments to capital markets, sustaining 
economic growth and eventually increasing the overall 
wealth and welfare of a nation has been increasingly 
recognized following financial crises and financial 
reporting scandals of various corporations around the 
world. A sound system of corporate governance is also 
expected to curb the managerial use of opportunistic 
earnings management activities and thus, enhance the 
quality of reported earnings (Hashim & Devi 2007). 
Erosions in earnings quality, transparency, and disclosure 
levels have caused investors to be less confident in the 
integrity of accounting numbers. Since investors need 
unbiased earnings information to make the right investment 
decisions, financial crises and financial reporting scandals 
have unveiled the importance of corporate governance 
reforms and highlighted the crucial need for firms to 
enhance the quality of reported earnings.
In Malaysia, the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) was first issued in 2000 and later 
amended in 20071. Constituting an effective board of 
directors by way of board leadership, board size and 
board independence are factors included in the essence of 
the MCCG. This study examines the relationship between 
board characteristics (i.e., board independence, board 
size and board leadership) and earnings quality after the 
amendment of the MCCG in 2007. The revised MCCG is 
designed to strengthen the role of the board of directors 
and audit committee; and to ensure that they discharge 
their roles and responsibility effectively. According 
to the revised MCCG, Malaysian firms are required to 
have audit committee members, at least 2/3 of whom 
are independent and one member being a member of an 
accounting association or body (revised MCCG 2007). 
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However, variables relating to the audit committee are 
not examined since it is a sub-committee of the board; 
hence, the ability of the board to monitor firm managers 
would eventually be reflected in the audit committee 
effectiveness. Moreover, the board of directors has the 
absolute power of monitoring and controlling the behavior 
of top managers to ensure that the latter do not behave in 
a way that may affect the firm’s wealth (Fama & Jesnen 
1983; Jensen & Meckling 1976).
 Relevance and reliability are viewed as two principle 
qualitative characteristics of earnings numbers. In order 
to be relevant, among other things, current earnings 
numbers must be persistent and have predictive values. 
As for the reliability, earnings information must be 
representationally faithful and free from errors and bias. 
Earnings persistence, predictability and informativeness 
are used to represent earnings quality in this study because 
the features are important characteristics of relevant and 
reliable earnings information.
The Malaysian market provides a unique and 
interesting setting in which to investigate the association 
between boards of directors and earnings quality for a 
number of reasons. First, many Malaysian firms are owned 
by family members who engage themselves in managing 
the firms and selecting board members (Cheung & Chan 
2004; Claessens & Fan 2002; Thillainathan 1991). This 
will likely jeopardize the true independence of a board 
of directors. Second, the legal protection for minority 
shareholders is argued to be relatively weak in the country 
(La Porta et al. 1998). Third, even though the demand for 
quality accounting information has increased in the last 
two decades, the quality of earnings numbers in Malaysia 
has not experienced much improvement (Fan & Wong 
2002). Investors still have reservations about the quality 
of earnings reported by Malaysian firms (Ball, Robin & 
Wu 2003). It is expected that if a firm has a strong board 
characteristics, information asymmetry among contracting 
parties will be reduced and the quality of earnings numbers 
will increase. However, research on the relationship 
between board characteristics and earnings quality 
produces mixed and inconclusive results. As the legal, 
social and culture factors of the Asian countries differ 
from those of Western countries, the question of whether 
the latter’s code of corporate governance is applicable to 
the former is something to consider.
This study contributes significantly for several 
reasons. Firstly, to the best of the knowledge of the authors, 
this study is the first attempt to examine the effectiveness of 
board characteristics in enhancing the quality of earnings 
using various proxies of earnings quality in the Malaysian 
context. A majority of the research focus on one particular 
attribute of earnings, such as earnings management 
or earnings informativeness, when investigating the 
relationship between board mechanisms and the quality 
of earnings numbers. Some of these studies may indicate 
a positive association between board mechanisms and 
earnings quality measured by earnings management, while 
the others found the opposite. Therefore, the present study 
extends previous research by linking board characteristics 
to the persistence, predictability, and informativeness 
of earnings numbers. Employing different proxies of 
earnings may provide collaborating evidence on the 
investors’ perceptions of the effect of board characteristics 
on financial statements. As far as the proxies of earnings 
quality is concerned, the present study relates closely to 
two extant studies, namely Laksmana and Yang (2009) and 
Velury and Jenkins (2006). The former provides evidence 
that socially responsible firms experience more predictable 
and persistent earnings than their peers, whie the latter 
finds that firms with institutional ownership report more 
predictable and informative earnings. The present study 
employs three measures of earnings quality to provide a 
better understanding of the role of board of directors under 
different earnings proxies: earnings persistence, earnings 
predictability, and earnings informativeness. Secondly, the 
present study extends the work of Ye, Zhang and Rezaee 
(2010) that investigates gender diversity and earnings 
quality by emphasizing the monitoring role of board of 
directors in the financial reporting process. Finally, most 
extant research conducted in Malaysia focuses primarily 
upon whether the chairman of the board is also the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) when measuring the relationship 
between board leadership and the quality of financial 
reports. The present study expands the previous work by 
using chairman independence rather than CEO duality as 
a proxy of board leadership.
Based upon an observation of 660 firm-years covering 
the years of 2008 and 2009, the present study finds 
evidence to support the notion that earnings numbers for 
firms with an independent chairman are of a higher quality 
than those of firms with a non-independent chairman. 
However, the results concerning the importance of board 
independence in enhancing earnings quality are mixed 
and inconclusive. Given the institutional environment in 
Malaysia, the results call for more independent, expert and 
committed directors to play a more effective monitoring 
role in firms’ financial reporting process. The present 
study provides information that can be considered by 
regulatory bodies in the future when revising the MCCG in 
order to regain investors’ confidence towards accounting 
and financial information.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. 
The next section reviews the literature and develops 
the hypotheses. The third section presents the research 
methods employed, including a description of the research 
design, sample selection procedure and variables tested in 
the main analysis. The fourth section presents the results 
and discussions. The final section concludes the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT
Financial reporting system is designed to provide value 
relevant accounting and financial information for all 
users including investors. Earnings information should be 
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relevant in helping investors make correct asset pricing 
and investment decisions (Yuan & Jiang 2008). However, 
earnings quality is qualitative in nature and several proxies 
must be used to measure it. Persistence and predictability 
are viewed as two important characteristics of earnings 
numbers that help investors in predicting future earnings 
and cash flows. Earnings are said to be of high quality 
when they are persistent. On the other hand, transitory 
earnings are viewed to be of low quality (Boonlert-U-
Thai, Meek & Nabar 2006). In addition, investors use 
earnings information to analyze a current performance 
of a particular firm and subsequently estimate its future 
prospects. Therefore, earnings numbers are viewed to be of 
high quality when they enable investors to better estimate 
the future prospects of a firm (Hussainey 2009). It is argued 
that the importance of predictive nature of accounting 
earnings is manifested when taking into consideration, for 
instance, the use of accounting earnings when valuating 
the equity of firms (Velury & Jenkins 2006). At the other 
end of the spectrum, earnings informativeness refers to 
the ability of earnings to influence the expectations of 
investors with respect to the quality of earnings figures, 
as reflected in changes in share price (Kormendi & Lipe 
1987).
Corporate governance mechanisms are structured 
to mitigate agency conflicts between managers and 
owners arising from the divergence of ownership from 
the control of a firm; constrain opportunistic earnings 
management activities; and, consequently, increase the 
veracity of accounting and financial information (Jensen 
& Meckling 1976). Corporate governance mechanisms 
also align the interests of shareholders with the managers; 
regain confidence of investors regarding the integrity 
of capital markets; and, thus, attract potential investors 
to these markets (Hashim & Devi 2007). As one of the 
mechanisms, the board of directors is expected to monitor 
and control the behavior of managers to ensure they act 
on the behalf of shareholders and protect shareholders 
investment (Hendry & Keil 2004). In addition, the board 
is accountable to endorse the strategy of the firm; develop 
directional policy; appoint, supervise, and remunerate 
senior executives; and ensure accountability of the firm 
to its related parties (Ponnu 2008). To be effective, 
the Cadbury Report (1992), for example, recommends 
the board to be comprised of majority of independent 
directors who are likely to bring an independent judgment. 
Independent directors effectively monitor firm activities; 
reduce agency costs; and, hence, improve earnings 
quality (Fama & Jensen 1983; Jensen & Meckling 
1976). Consistent with these assertions, empirical studies 
conclude that reported earnings quality is enhanced as 
the proportion of independent directors increases (e.g., 
Anderson, Gillan & Deli 2003; Dimitropoulos & Asteriou 
2010; Petra 2007; Sahlan 2011).
 However, proponents of the stewardship theory view 
insiders (executive directors) as trustworthy individuals 
and good stewards of firm resources. Compared to 
independent directors, insiders have more information and 
knowledge about firm activities, which can facilitate the 
decision-making process. Lee et al. (2005) support this 
view by providing evidence that Chinese investors react 
less, instead of more, to earnings information disclosed 
by firms with high percentage of independent directors. 
Furthermore, Tiscini and Di Donato (2009) demonstrate 
that firms with a large number of independent directors 
experience earnings of low quality. Since the majority of 
extant research supports a positive contribution of board 
independence, the present study expects that firms with 
a large proportion of independent directors experience 
higher earnings quality than their lower counterparts. 
Based on this expectation and agency theory, the following 
hypothesis is developed: 
H1 Board independence is positively related to earnings 
quality.
 Board size is an important element that impacts the 
effectiveness of board oversight duties. It is believed 
that smaller boards are easier to coordinate; quicker in 
making decisions; less likely to have free-rider problems; 
and less likely to oppose innovation (Dimitropoulos 
& Asteriou 2010). Smaller boards also facilitate the 
influential exchange of ideas between the firm and its 
directors and are less likely to exacerbate the coalition 
costs among board members (Vafeas 2000). Consistent 
with these assertions, Cho and Rui (2009) and Vafeas 
(2000) provide empirical evidence that firms with smaller 
boards experience earnings numbers of high quality.
On the contrary, larger boards are viewed as 
having expert board members, especially those who are 
independent and can provide environmental links. Studies 
concerning financial reporting quality conclude that 
managers of firms with larger boards are less expected to 
engage in opportunistic behavior of earnings management 
that may deteriorate the quality of earnings numbers to 
interested parties (Bradbury et al. 2006; Ismail et al. 
2009). The findings of these studies are consistent with the 
resource dependency theory perception of the role of larger 
boards in enhancing firm performance and accordingly 
reducing the incidence of earnings management. On the 
other hand, studies by Dimitropolus and Asteriou (2010) 
and Sarikhani and Ebrahimi (2011) reveal that board size 
has no significant influence on earnings quality. Although 
the findings are mixed, following the agency theory 
assertion, the following hypothesis is developed:
H2 Board size is negatively related to earnings quality.
 Board leadership is another mechanism that affects 
the monitoring role of boards of directors. It is argued that 
vesting the power of a chairman and a CEO to one individual 
(i.e., CEO duality) compromises board independence and 
motivates managers to seek private interest in lieu of 
shareholder interest (Chang & Sun 2010; Firth, Fung & 
Rui 2007; Jensen 1994). This argument is in favor of role 
duality, which views the board chairman as accountable 
for setting agendas; running the board meetings; and firing, 
hiring, monitoring and evaluating executive directors 
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including the CEO. Meanwhile, the principal role of the 
CEO also requires involves the day to day management 
activities of the firm (Petra 2007). Combining the two 
roles enables the CEO to simultaneously make decisions 
and monitor those decisions and activities (Firth, Fung & 
Rui 2007). Anderson et al. (2003), Gul and Lai (2002) and 
Prencipe and Par-Yosef (2011) provide evidence that the 
quality of reported earnings deteriorates as the differing 
roles of a chairperson and a CEO are combined. 
However, the present study examines whether board 
leadership improves earnings quality. The independence 
of the board chairman is used as a broader measure 
of board leadership because 93% of the sample of the 
present study exhibits a very high level of compliance 
with the Malaysian finance committee recommendation 
that the two positions of a Chairman and a CEO should be 
separated. Fama and Jensen (1983) expect an independent 
chairman to improve board effectiveness by providing 
constant monitoring of the performance of the CEO. It is 
also expected that an independent chairman will enable 
the board to effectively discharge its oversight duties, 
particularly those belonging to the CEO (Jensen 1994). 
Based upon these expectations, the following alternative 
hypothesis is developed: 
H3 Board leadership is positively related to earnings 
quality.
RESEARCH METHODS
SAMPLE SELECTION
The sample of the present study consists of all firms 
listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia for which 
the necessary data are available for the sample period. 
Following earnings quality studies, finance firms are 
excluded from the sample as they are more regulated and 
have a different nature of financial reports. To increase the 
homogeneity of the sample, companies whose financial 
year-ends are not 31 December are eliminated. The present 
requires data for the years 2007 and 2010, in addition 
to data for 2008 and 2009, in order to measure earnings 
quality. Therefore, newly listed firms during the four year 
period (2007 through 2010) that may bias the findings of 
this study are eliminated. The final sample consists of 
660 observations for 330 companies across the two year 
period (2008 and 2009). Variables with extreme values are 
transformed to mitigate the possible influence of outliers 
on the estimate of coefficients (Tabachnick & Fidell 1996). 
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection criteria.
The panel data consist of observations over a two year 
period. However pooled cross-sectional regressions are 
used to test the hypotheses of the present study because the 
variables do not vary over time, which does not warrant 
the use of fixed effect or random effect regressions.
TABLE 1. Sample selection criteria
             Criteria No. of firm-years
 Companies listed on the Main market of Bursa Malaysia in 2008 and 2009. 1750
 Less:
 Finance, insurance, investment, and real estate companies (228)
 Companies with other than December 31 fiscal year end (672) 
 Newly listed companies (90)
 Companies with insufficient financial data (50)
 Companies with insufficient corporate governance data (50)
 Final sample 660
MODELS SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION
Earnings numbers are deemed by researchers to be of high 
quality when they are more persistent; more strongly related 
to future cash flow realization; and more strongly related 
to contemporaneous share price performance (Dechow & 
Schrand 2004). Therefore, earnings persistence, earnings 
predictability and earnings informativeness are utilized in 
the present study to represent earnings quality. 
Earnings Persistence  Following Atwood, Drake and 
Myers (2010) and Ye et al. (2010), an earnings persistence 
model is used to measure earnings sustainability. The slope 
coefficient from a regression of one-year ahead earnings 
on current earnings is used to test the sustainability of 
current earnings. Earnings numbers with values of α1 
close to one or greater than one are viewed as persistent, 
while those with values of α1 close to zero are considered 
as transitory (Boonlert-U-Thai, Meek & Nabar 2006). 
Additionally, each of the board of director variables are 
interacted with current earnings to empirically examine 
the incremental effect of the variables on the relationship 
between current and future earnings. The primary model 
is as follows:
EARNit + 1 = α0 + α1EARN + α2EARN*BDIND + 
α3EARN*BDSIZE + α4EARN*CHIND 
+ α5EARN*SIZE + α6EARN*DEBT + 
α7EARN*LOSS + α8YEAR + ε    (1)
Where EARNit + 1 is the one-year-ahead net income before 
extraordinary items scaled by the beginning of total 
assets; EARN is current net income before extraordinary 
items scaled by the beginning of total assets; BDIND is the 
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proportion of independent directors to the total number 
of directors on the board; BDSIZE is the total number of 
directors on the board; CHIND is a binary variable with 
a value of 1 (0 if otherwise) if board chairman is an 
independent director; SIZE is the natural log of total assets; 
DEBT is long term debt to total assets; LOSS is a binary 
variable with a value of 1 for loss firms and 0 if otherwise; 
YEAR is a binary variable with 1 for 2008 observations 
and 0 if otherwise; and* denotes the interactions between 
variables and ε is the error term 2.
The coefficient α3 is estimated to have a significant 
and negative value, while the estimated coefficients on α2 
and α4 are expected to be significantly positive. Positive 
and significant coefficients indicate that firms with 
independent boards and independent chairmen are more 
likely to have persistent earnings. In contrast, a negative 
coefficient implies that earnings numbers of firms with 
large boards are less expected to persist in the future.
Earnings Predictability  Earnings predictability 
reflects the ability of investors to estimate future cash 
flows. Among contracting parties, investors use earnings 
information to analyze the performance of a particular 
firm of interest and in turn estimate its future prospects. 
Thus, earnings information of high quality should enable 
investors to better estimate the future prospects of a firm 
(Hussainey 2009). Earnings predictability is measured 
by the slope coefficient from a regression of one-year-
ahead cash flows on current earnings (Atwood et al. 2010; 
Velury & Jenkins 2006; Ye et al. 2010). A positive and 
significant sign of β1 implies amore predictive earnings, 
whereas a negative and significant sign on β1 is viewed as 
a less predictive earnings. Interactions of current earnings 
variable with each of the board of directors’ variables are 
created to examine the incremental effect of the variables 
on earnings predictability (current earnings-future cash 
flow relationship). The primary model is as follows:
CFOit + 1 = β 0 + β 1EARN + β 2EARN*BDIND + 
β3EARN*BDSIZE + β4EARN*CHIND 
+ β5EARN*SIZE + β6EARN*DEBT + 
β7EARN*LOSS + β8YEAR + ε     (2)
Where CFOit + 1 represents the operating cash flows for firm 
i at year t+1 scaled by the beginning of total assets; and all 
other variables are as previously defined. The coefficient 
of β3 is expected to be significantly negative, while those 
with β2 and β4 are estimated to be positive and significant. 
Firms with independent boards and independent chairmen 
are expected to be more likely to report high predictive 
value earnings. On the other hand, the earnings numbers 
of firms with large boards are expected to be less likely 
to have the ability to predict future cash flows. 
Earnings Informativeness  In light of efficient market 
theory, the announcement of earnings numbers should 
be reflected in price changes. Drawing on the theory, 
investors face difficulty to predict stock price and returns 
using earnings numbers contained in financial statements. 
The return-earnings relationship is the widely used model 
by academic researchers to investigate the extent to 
which Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) increases or 
decreases from a regression of share returns on earnings 
(e.g., Ahmed, Hossain & Adams 2006; Niu 2006; Velury 
& Jenkins 2006). Similarly, the present study uses the 
slope coefficient from the regression of returns on earnings 
per share to measure earnings informativeness. Earnings 
numbers are considered informative when δ1 in Equation 
(3) is statistically different from zero. Furthermore, each of 
the board of director variables is interacted with earnings 
per share to examine the incremental effect of the variables 
on the relationship between returns and earnings per share. 
The model is as follows: 
RET = δ0 + δ1EPS + δ2EPS*BDIND + δ3EPS*BDSIZE + 
δ4EPS*CHIND + δ5EPS*SIZE + δ6EPS*DEBT + 
δ7EPS*LOSS + δ8YEAR + ε       (3)
RET represents the share returns cumulated over a period 
of 12 months starting from nine months before fiscal year 
to three months after the fiscal year end, calculated as (Pit-
Pit - 1) / Pit - 1 where Pit is the last traded total returns index 
of firm i at time t and Pit - 1 is the last total returns index 
of firm i at time t-1. EPS is earnings before extraordinary 
items per share for firm i at year t, divided by the beginning 
of share price; and all other variables are as previously 
defined. α3 is estimated to be negatively significant, while 
the estimated coefficients of α2 and α4 are expected to have 
positive and significant values. Positive and significant 
coefficients indicate that firms with independent boards 
and independent chairman are more likely to report 
informative earnings. In contrast, a negative coefficient 
implies that earnings numbers of firms with large boards 
are expected to be less informative.
In the present study, independent non-executive 
directors are defined as directors who are not officers of the 
firm; independent from the management and controlling 
shareholders; and not representative of concentrated 
or family holding of its shares (Finance Committee on 
Corporate Governance 2000). An independent chairman 
is one who is not a current or former CEO of the firm and 
he or she must be independent from the management 
of the firm (Carrott 2008; Felton & Wong 2004). Size 
(SIZE), leverage (DEBT) and Loss (LOSS) are included in 
the three models to control for their possible impact on the 
reporting quality of earnings numbers as found in extant 
studies. In addition, a year dummy variable is included 
in the models to control for the year fixed effect as the 
present study uses the pooled cross-sectional models to 
run the regressions.
The existence of multicollinearity problems is 
assessed by the correlation matrix and the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF). The coefficients for the correlation 
matrix and VIF values show that multicollinearity problems 
do not exist. Using the White Test, hetroskedasticity is 
found to be a problem in the models. To address this 
problem, a heteroskedasticity-corrected least square is 
estimated using Gretl software3.
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RESULTS
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the continuous 
variables, while Table 3 reports the distribution of 
companies according to board leadership (CHIND) and 
performance (LOSS). The mean values of one-year-ahead 
earnings (EARNit + 1), current earnings (EARNit), and one-
year-ahead operating cash flows (CFOit + 1) are 3.5%, 3.4%, 
and 6.7%, respectively. The mean value of share returns 
(RET) is 20.7%, whereas earnings per share (EPS) has a 
mean value of 2.5%. The value of board independence 
(BDIND) ranges from 17% to 86%, with a mean value 
of 44%. This shows that companies exist that do not 
comply with the requirement to have at least one-third 
of the directors whom are independent. The board size 
(BDSIZE) ranges from 4 to 17 with a mean of 8 directors. 
This average is within the range recommended by Jensen 
(1994), a number which is said to contribute to effective 
decision makings. Table 3 shows that 223 (34%) of the 
firms have an independent chairman (CHIND) and 151 
firms (23%) are considered poor performers.
TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics for continuous variables
    Variables Min Max Mean Median  Std dev   Skewness   kurtosis©
 EARNit + 1 -0.396  0.390 0.035 0.038  0.085 -0.656 4.348
 EARN -0.475  0.390 0.034 0.038  0.083 -0.716 5.621
 CFOit + 1 -0.662  0.546 0.067 0.056  0.102 -0.123 6.729
 RET -1.466  4.015 0.207 0.116  0.644 1.452 4.419
 EPS -6.578  2.627 0.025 0.076  0.502 -6.912 82.286
 BDIND 0.167  0.857 0.439 0.429  0.108 0.727 0.526
 BDSIZE 4 17 7.55 7.000 1.842 1.011 2.642
 SIZE (in million RM) 22.9 43,407 1,220.8 341.8 3,515.9 7.563 69.573
 DEBT 0.000  0.710 0.098 0.050  0.124 1.858 3.749
Notes: EARNit + 1: one-year-ahead net income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning of total assets. EARNit: current net 
income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning of total assets. CFOit + 1: one-year-ahead operating cash flows scaled by 
the beginning of total assets. RETit: share returns for 12 months starting from nine months before fiscal year to three months after 
the fiscal year end, calculated as (Pit-Pit - 1) / Pit - 1 (Pit is the last traded total returns index of firm i at time t and Pit - 1 is the last total 
returns index of firm i at time t-1). EPSit: earnings before extraordinary items per share scaled by the beginning of share price. 
BDINDit: the percentage of independent non-executives directors on the board, BDSIZEit: total number of directors on the board. 
ZISEit: total assets, DEBT: long term debt to total assets ratio. © Variables with skewness values more (less) than 1.96 and kurtosis 
values more (less) than 2 are transformed using either normal score or natural logarithm. 
TABLE 3. Distribution of dummy variables
 Variables     No      Yes
  Freq. Mean Freq. Mean
 CHIND 437 66.212 223 33.788
 LOSS 509 77.12 151 22.88
Notes: CHIND: dummy variable with a value of 1 if the board is 
headed by independent chairman and 0 if otherwise. LOSS: 
dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for loss firms and 0 if 
otherwise.
Table 4 shows the Pearson correlation matrix of the 
variables tested without the interaction effects to show 
the association between variables. In order to examine 
the univariate association between board characteristics 
and earnings quality proxies, the sample is partitioned into 
two groups based upon BDIND, BDSIZE and CHIND. Board 
independence is measured using a binary variable with a 
value of 1 if BDIND is greater than the median value and 
zero if otherwise. Similarly, board size takes a value of 
1 if BDSIZE is greater than the median value and zero if 
otherwise. Board leadership or chairman independence 
(CHIND), as previously measured, takes a value of 1 if the 
chairman is independent and 0 if otherwise. The proxies 
of earnings quality of the two groups of BDIND, BDSIZE 
and CHIND are then compared.
Univariate tests are performed to support the main 
analysis. The results, as presented in Table 5, show that 
the difference between low and high board independence 
(and board leadership) is not statistically significant for 
each of earnings quality proxies. The scores for earnings 
quality proxies differ significantly between large and 
small companies. However, in contradiction with the 
expectations of the present study, firms with larger boards 
are more likely to report higher earnings quality. In sum, 
the findings do not support the contention that firms 
with independent board members, independent chairmen 
and smaller size experience earnings numbers of high 
quality.
Table 6 reports the results of the tests of the 
association between the board of director variables and 
earnings persistence using the heteroskedasticity-corrected 
least square regressions. As shown in the table, the 
estimated coefficient on EARN is positively significant at 
the 0.01 level, implying that Malaysian investors make 
use of the listed companies current earnings to evaluate 
the sustainability of earnings numbers in the coming year. 
As far as the board variables are concerned, only board 
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TABLE 4. Correlation matrix
 Exp variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
 1. EARNit + 1 1          
 2. EARN 0.727** 1         
 3. CFOit + 1 0.535** 0.462** 1        
 4. RET 0.152** 0.170** 0.022 1       
 5. EPS 0.522** 0.476** 0.257** 0.333** 1      
 6. BDIND -0.123** -0.090* -0.130** -0.009 -0.079* 1     
 7. BDSIZE 0.157** 0.180** 0.101** 0.033 0.151** -0.274** 1    
 8. CHIND -0.067 -0.022 -0.054 -0.017 -0.019 0.235** -0.017 1   
 9. SIZE 0.209** 0.214** 0.128** -0.048 0.157** -0.069 0.361** -0.015 1  
 10. BDET -0.224** -0.218** -0.120** -0.068 -0.104** 0.027 0.042 0.023 0.294** 1 
 11. LOSS -0.507** -0.715** -0.303** -0.107** -0.708** 0.089* -0.216** 0.038 -0.250** 0.104** 1
Notes: ** and * denote significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
TABLE 5. Univariate tests
 Variable Board Difference Board size Difference Board leadership Difference
  independence in means  in means  in means
  1 0  1 0  1 0 
 PERC 0.0338 0.0372 -0.0034 0.0404 0.0250 0.0154*** 0.0333 0.0362 -0.0029
 PRED 0.0659 0.0686 -0.0027 0.0709 0.0592 0.0117*** 0.0655 0.0678 -0.0023
 ERC 0.2075 0.2055 0.0020 0.2105 0.1987 0.0118** 0.2054 0.2072 -0.0018
Notes: PERC: relationship between one-year-ahead earnings and current earnings. PRED: relationship between one-year-ahead operating cash flows 
and current earnings. ERC: earnings response coefficient. ** and *** denote significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
TABLE 6. Regression results for the association between board characteristics and
earnings persistence
Dependent variable: Earnings (EARNit + 1)
 Explanatory variables Expected sign Coefficient  T-statistic VIF
 Const ? -0.018  -0.504 
 EARN + 0.780  16.829*** 3.063
 EARN*BDIND + -0.022  -0.672 1.203
 EARN*BDSIZE - 0.017  0.528 1.333
 EARN*CHIND + 0.134  2.440** 1.709
 EARN*SIZE - -0.080  -2.235** 1.399
 EARN*DEBT - 0.005  0.190 1.150
 EARN*LOSS - -0.160  -2.165** 2.756
 YEAR(2008) ? -0.037  -0.749 1.004
 R2   0.584
 Adjusted R2   0.579 
 F-statistic   114.108*** 
Notes: EARNit+1: normal score of one-year-ahead net income before extraordinary items scaled by the 
beginning of total assets. EARN: normal score of current net income before extraordinary items 
scaled by the beginning of total assets. BDIND: the percentage of independent non-executives 
directors on the board, BDSIZE: normal score of total number of directors on the board. CHIND: 
board leadership. ZISE: natural log of total assets, DEBT: normal score of long term debt to total 
assets ratio. LOSS: firm loss. YEAR: fixed year effects. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 
0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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leadership has a significant effect on earnings persistence 
and the direction is as expected. This indicates that firms 
with an independent chairman are more likely to sustain 
their earnings numbers. Contrary to the expectations of 
the present study, board independence and board size 
are not significantly related to one-year-ahead earnings, 
indicating that the two variables do not influence investor 
perceptions concerning the ability of current earnings to 
continue in the future.
As for the control variables, EARN*SIZE is negatively 
and significantly associated with one-year-ahead earnings. 
This result is consistent with the expectation of the 
present study that larger firms produce earnings numbers 
of less quality as managers of these firms adopt income-
decreasing discretionary accruals to reduce political costs 
(Watts & Zimmerman 1978). Moreover, the coefficient of 
EARN*LOSS has a negative and significant impact on one-
year-ahead earnings, supporting the notion that managers 
of loss firms are more likely to engage in opportunistic 
earnings management activities to avoid exhibiting 
negative earnings.
The results of the relationship between the board of 
director variables and earnings predictability is presented 
in Table 7. The positive and significant coefficient of 
EARN indicates that Malaysian investors use the reported 
earnings of firms to anticipate future cash flows. Consistent 
with earnings persistence model, EARN*CHIND is positively 
and significantly associated with one-year-ahead cash 
flows. This result implies that current earnings numbers 
of firms with an independent chairman are better able to 
predict future cash flows than those of firms with a non-
independent chairman.
TABLE 7. Regression results for the association between board characteristics and 
earnings predictability
Dependent variable: operating cash flows (CFOit + 1)
 Explanatory variables Expected sign Coefficient  T-statistic VIF
 const ? -0.180  -3.919*** 
 EARN + 0.482  7.912*** 3.063
 EARN*BDIND + -0.066  -1.881* 1.203
 EARN*BDSIZE - -0.057  -1.549 1.333
 EARN*CHIND + 0.185  2.911*** 1.709
 EARN*LNSIZE - -0.015  -0.390 1.399
 EARN*DEBT - -0.050  -1.731* 1.150
 EARN*LOSS - -0.184  -2.208** 2.756
 YEAR008 ? 0.302  4.716*** 1.004
 R2   0.290
 Adjusted R2   0.281 
 F-statistic   33.216*** 
Notes: CFOit + 1: normal score of one-year-ahead operating cash flows scaled by the beginning of total 
assets. EARN: normal score of current net income before extraordinary items scaled by the 
beginning of total assets. BDIND: the percentage of independent non-executives directors on the 
board, BDSIZE: normal score of total number of directors on the board. CHIND: board leadership. 
ZISE: natural log of total assets, DEBT: normal score of long term debt to total assets ratio. LOSS: 
firm loss. YEAR: fixed year effects. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
levels, respectively. 
However, the negative and significant coefficient of 
EARN*BDIND suggests a high predictive value of earnings 
for firms with executive directors. This result is in 
conformity with the stewardship theory’s perception of the 
ability of executive directors to enhance firm performance 
and hence minimize the probability of reporting less 
predictive earnings. Inconsistent with the univariate tests, 
board size has no significant incremental influence on 
current earnings-future cash flow relation. The estimated 
coefficients on EARN*DEBT and EARN*LOSS are negatively 
and significantly associated with one-year-ahead cash 
flows. These results imply that managers of high leveraged 
and loss firms are more likely to engage in opportunistic 
earnings management activities to avoid violation of debt 
covenant and presenting negative earnings. Hence, the 
ability of earnings to predict future cash flows in such 
firms is impaired.
Finally, the results on the relationship between board 
characteristics and earnings informativeness is presented 
in Table 8. The estimated coefficient on EPS is positive and 
significant, supporting the view that Malaysian investors 
make use of information concerning the annual earnings 
of listed companies and, consequently, earnings numbers 
are informative. EPS*BDIND is positively and significantly 
related to share returns, but with a marginal value of 0.043. 
In conformity with earnings persistence and predictability 
models, the coefficient of EPS*CHIND has a positive and 
significant influence on share returns. The results imply 
that firms with independent directors and an independent 
chairman are more likely to report informative earnings. 
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These findings are consistent with the agency theory’s 
perception of the role of independent boards in enhancing 
earnings quality. Among the controlling variables, 
EPS*LOSS is significantly associated with share returns. 
This supports the negative contribution of loss on the 
quality of earnings information.
In Malaysian firms, the presence of family members on 
the board is prevalent. This will make board independence 
represent the “form,” but not the “substance,” of an 
effective board of directors. The findings of the present 
study indicate a need to revisit the revised MCCG in the near 
future in order to restore investor confidence regarding 
accounting and financial information. The findings also 
indicate a need for more independent and committed 
directors to play a more effective monitoring role in the 
financial reporting processes of firms. With the exception 
of board leadership, the results are consistent with the 
pre-revised MCCG 2007 studies, which suggest board 
of director mechanisms are not effective in enhancing 
financial reporting quality (e.g., Abdullah, Yusof & Nor 
2010; Bradbury et al. 2006; Ismail et al. 2009; Mohamad, 
Rashid & Shawtari 2012).
TABLE 8. Regression results for the association between board characteristics 
and earnings informativeness
Dependent variable: share returns (RET)
 Explanatory variables Expected sign Coefficient  T-statistic VIF
 const ? 0.406  8.849*** 
 EPS + 0.368  7.674*** 3.063
 EPS*BDIND + 0.043  1.741* 1.200
 EPS*BDSIZE - 0.009  0.250 1.410
 EPS*CHIND + 0.108  1.831* 1.668
 EPS*LNSIZE - 0.009  0.226 1.541
 EPS*DEBT - 0.016  0.511 1.157
 EPS*LOSS - -0.361  -4.187*** 2.575
 YEAR008 ? -1.016  -18.266*** 1.541
 R2                           0.490
 Adjusted R2    0.484
 F-statistic   78.287*** 
Notes: RET: normal score of share returns for 12 months starting form nine months before fiscal year 
to three months after the fiscal year end, calculated as (Pit-Pit-1) / Pit - 1 (Pit is the last traded total 
returns index of firm i at time t and Pit - 1 is the last total returns index of firm i at time t-1). EPS: 
normal score of earnings before extraordinary items per share. BDIND: proportion independent 
non-executives directors on the board. BDSIZE: normal score of total number of directors on the 
board. CHIND: board leadership. ZISE: natural log of total assets. DEBT: normal score of long 
term debt to total assets ratio. LOSS: firm loss; YEAR: fixed year effects. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
Corporate governance researchers argue that a composite 
index can capture the actual capability of corporate 
governance practices to enhance earnings quality (e.g., 
Gul et al. 2011; Jiang & Anandarajan 2009; Lara, Osma 
& Penalva 2007; Pergola & Joseph 2011; Yu 2011). It has 
also been argued that traditional measures of mechanisms 
of the board of directors (i.e., board independence, 
board size, CEO duality, and board expertise) do not 
guarantee effective monitoring of the board as these 
mechanisms complement each other and any attempt 
to individually assess their quality is not appropriate 
(Connelly, Limpaphayom & Nagarajan 2012; Lara et 
al. 2007). Hence, the present study develops a board of 
directors index (BDI) that aggregates the scores of the 
board mechanisms investigated in the present study4. The 
incorporated mechanisms and scores attached to them are 
shown in Appendix 1. 
BDI ranges from zero to three. A higher index score 
indicates effective board of directors, with a BDI of three 
being the highest. The three previous models are rerun 
using the new variable (BDI) instead of board independence, 
board size and board leadership5. The untabulated results 
indicate that even though the coefficient of BDI is 
positive, the board of director index is not statistically 
related to earnings persistence, earnings predictability 
and earnings informativeness. However, these findings 
are not surprising as the board practices incorporated in 
the index and their related weights are arbitrary (Klein, 
Shapiro & Young 2005; Yu 2011). Therefore, the index 
may miss the actual source and magnitude of board effects 
on earnings quality.
The present study also examines whether the 
effectiveness of the board of directors is influenced by 
information environment. Gosh and Moon (2010) argue 
that investors are less expected to rely on CEO ownership to 
evaluate earnings quality when firms have other sources of 
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information about the CEO. Given that large firms possess 
better information environments than small firms, the 
relationship between the board of directors’ variables and 
earnings quality is expected to be weaker in large firms. 
To test this proposition, the sample is partitioned into large 
and small firms based upon total assets (a measure of firm 
size). Firms with above (below) sample median total assets 
are considered as large (small) firms. Only the results of 
the partitioned earnings predictability model are reported 
(see Table 9) since the board variables have no significant 
effect on earnings persistence and informativeness in both 
the large and small firm subsamples6.
The result of the earnings predictability model shows 
that the effect of board leadership on the ability of earnings 
to predict future cash flows is stronger for small firms than 
for large firms. Even though board size has no influence 
on earnings predictability in large firms, it is negatively 
and significantly related to one-year-ahead cash flows in 
the small firms subsample. The adjusted R2 is 0.464 (F-stat 
= 42.373) for small firms, but is 0.215 (F-stat = 13.708) 
for large firms. Overall, this finding lends partial support 
to the notion that investor reliance on information of the 
board of directors to assess the quality of reported earnings 
is much greater when firms are relatively small.
TABLE 9. Association between board characteristics and earnings predictability in different firm size
 
Explanatory variables
 Combined Large firms Small firms
  N = 660 N = 325 N = 335
 Const -0.180(-3.919)*** -0.149(-2.110)** -0.211(-2.845)***
 EARN 0.482(7.912)*** 0.507(5.630)*** 0.436(5.111)***
 EARN*BDIND -0.066(-1.881)* -0.071(-1.123) -0.083(-2.169)**
 EARN*BDSIZE -0.057(-1.549) 0.022(0.320) -0.073(-1.710)*
 EARN*CHIND 0.185(2.911)*** 0.215(1.660)* 0.186(3.055)***
 EARN*DEBT -0.050(-1.731)*  -0.079(-1.379) -0.062(-2.378)**
 EARN*LOSS -0.184(-2.208)** -0.221(-1.502) -0.132(-1.232)
 YEAR008 0.302(4.716)*** 0.187(2.120)** 0.350(3.980)***
 Adjusted R2 0.281 0.215 0.464
 F-statistic 33.216*** 13.708*** 42.373***
  *, ** and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The present study investigates the association between 
board characteristics and earnings quality in the Malaysian 
context using three measures of earnings quality: earnings 
persistence, predictability, and informativeness. The 
findings provide useful and practical implications. First, 
investors of firms with an independent chairman are 
better able to evaluate the sustainability, predictability and 
informativeness of earnings numbers. Second, although 
independent directors have a positive and significant 
role in enhancing the informativeness of earnings, their 
contribution is negative towards improving earnings 
ability to predict future cash flows. Third, investors do 
not perceive board size as a good indicator of relevant and 
reliable earnings numbers. Management intervention in 
the selection of outside directors; the lack of knowledge of 
the affairs of a firm by outside directors; the informational 
dependence of outside directors on the top managers; and 
the domination and controlling of top managers on board 
activities in Malaysian firms may possibly explain the 
unexpected results. the present study indicates a need for a 
clear definition of the term “independence.” For example, 
Bursa Malaysia may consider director independence 
to include other factors such as the participation of 
directors in the share options or stock performance-based 
pay schemes of a firm; and the tenure of a director as a 
board member or an employee of the company. Further, 
the present study provides evidence to support a stricter 
definition of chairman independence. The current 
requirement of the MCCG that a role separation between 
the chairman and the CEO of a firm exist may not be strict 
enough to warrant an independent Chairman7.
The findings of the present study may be subjected 
to several limitations that could be a platform for future 
research. Since the time period of the present study is 
limited to two years (i.e., 2008 and 2009), the measurement 
of earnings proxies (i.e., earnings persistence, earnings 
predictability and earnings informativeness) is based upon 
the pooled models for the two years. A longitudinal study 
can be conducted to provide an in-depth understanding of 
the sustainability and predictability of current earnings. 
Second, the findings of the present study may not be 
applicable to other developed countries with high investor 
protection; less family ownership; less concentrated and 
no pyramidal ownership. As the conflict of interest is 
different in the two settings (developed and developing 
countries), governance practices play different roles in 
these settings. 
Future studies may use a number of years after the new 
requirements to perform and in-depth examination of the 
effect of corporate governance practices on the earnings 
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matrices used in the present study. It would be worthwhile 
to investigate the role of other governance practices (e.g., 
independent directors’ commitment, directors share option 
schemes, family ownership, and matters related to audit, 
compensation and nominating committees) in enhancing 
earnings persistence, predictability and informativeness.
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ENDNOTES
1 The Code was again revised is 2012 and issued as Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance 2012.
2 For simplicity and consistency, the use of the subscript it 
(to denote company i and current time t) is omitted in all 
the independent variables and error term on the right hand 
side of the equation. This also applies to Equations 2 and 
3. 
3 To see how heteroskedasticity-corrected least square is 
performed, please refer to the study by Aktas and Oncu 
(2002: 81).
4 Extant indexes, such as the Gombers’ index or the Brown 
and Gayor’s index, are not suitable for the Malaysian 
market as they are built mainly from provisions relating to 
takeover defences and restrictions on shareholders rights. 
Hostile takeovers are rare in the Malaysian market due to 
concentrated ownership and unique institutional settings. 
5 Like other research on corporate governance, the present 
study expects BDI to have a positive and significant 
influence on earnings quality. 
6 Except for Table 9, tables showing the results of additional 
analyses are not included in the paper. However, they are 
available from authors upon request. 
7 Effective from 2012, Bursa Malaysia made it compulsory 
for Malaysian firms to separate the two roles of CEO and 
chairman; and to have the chairman who must be a non- 
executive member of the board.
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APPENDIX 1
Board of Directors Index (BDI) components
  Items              Score
 BDIND 1 for firms with above sample median BDIND for the year and 0 if otherwise
 BDSIZE 1 for firms with below sample median BDSIZE for the year and 0 if otherwise
 CHIND 1 for firms with independent chairman and 0 if otherwise
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